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KEEPING OUT THE LITTLE GUY: AN OLDER CONTRACT





Imagine Jane, a twenty-six year-old attorney who just passed the Penn-
sylvania Bar exam and the National Football League Players' Association
("NFLPA ") contract advisor's certification exam. Having passed these ex-
ams, Jane now seeks to pursue her dream of becoming a contract advisor. 
1
Luckily, Jane's monthly expenses are low. Her combined rent, student
loans, car payments and office overhead, including bills and utilities, only
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J.D. from Temple University School of Law in 1962, and his LL.M. in Tax Law
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ment, and communications consulting and management firm
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1. Although one does not have to be a lawyer to be an agent or a contract
advisor, a substantial portion of agents and contract advisors are sports lawyers as
there is great demand for legal advice in the relationship amongst agents, athletes,
college teams and professional franchises.
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total $2,500 a month. The only expenses remaining before she starts practic-
ing are state registration fees and practice costs. Being the well-organized
person she is, Jane jots down the following expenses and notes, all of which
are independent of her aforementioned personal expenses and practice
overhead.
1. $1,600 - NFLPA certification fee.
2. $200 - Roundtrip ticket to the NFLPA annual seminar.
3. $200 - Lodging/Cab fare for the seminar.
4. State registration fees (Note to self - only register in states within
driving distance. If I provide great individual service, the practice
will grow):
a. Pennsylvania - $200 plus $100 underwriter's fee for the
bond.
b. Maryland - $1,000
c. New York - $100
d. Connecticut - $200
e. Ohio - $500
f New Jersey - $0 (No athlete agent laws there yet, so no fee!)
g. Delaware - $2,500
h. West Virginia - $50
5. Annual transportation (gas, tolls, etc.) - $1,000
6. Malpractice Insurance - $3,000
TOTAL - $10,650for year one, before personal expenses orprac-
tice overhead.
2
After compiling this list, Jane pays these fees and sets forth in pursuit of
her dream. Six months later, Jane has yet to secure a client. She did have
one player, but he was only on the practice squad and his team cut him
during the pre-season. Consequently, she is behind on her car payments and
cannot afford the upcoming NFLPA annual renewal fee of $1,200. If
things continue this way, she will not be able to renew her registration in the
foregoing states, even if she excludes Delaware and/or Maryland.
A month later, Jane's struggles continue. Fortunately, she was able to
move back in with her parents, but her debt and bills are mounting. With
no hope in sight, Jane is forced to abandon her ailing practice. As she walks
out of her office for the last time, she glances back with tears in her eyes and
promises herself that one day she will be a successful contract advisor.
It is not fair that Jane could not afford to compete in the field
of her choice. Unfortunately, it is a reality that aspiring NFLPA
2. This list is for illustration purposes only. It does not include the registra-
tion fees associated with representing clients in Major League Baseball, profes-
sional hockey or professional basketball.
[Vol. 12: p. 1
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contract advisors face at the hands of the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act ("UAAA"), the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
("SPARTA"), Section 2(g) of the NFLPA's Rules Governing Con-
tract Advisors ("Section 2(g)"), and the myriad of state registration
fees.
3
These regulations and the fees they produce are unfair, be-
cause they bar young contract advisors from the industry. 4 Simulta-
neously, that unfairness reduces professional business intimacy.
The solution to these problems is creating an affordable federal li-
censure for athlete agents. To establish licensure, we must modify
the UAAA, amend SPARTA and revise Section 2(g).
This article reviews the background of the athlete agent indus-
try, depicts the problems associated with the aforementioned regu-
lations and fees, and details the foregoing solution.
II. BACKGROUND
In the last thirty-five years, the athlete agent industry has
changed dramatically. Early on there were a handful of sports law-
yers and agents. Today, professional sports and its promotion dom-
inate American popular culture. Consequently, agents have the
potential to earn handsome livings. As a result, law schools and
undergraduate institutions are filled with young men and women,
seeking to become the next super sports agent to the stars and re-
ceive the fame of HBO's Arliss or the fabled "Show Me the Money"
Jerry McGuire.
During this boom, a handful of agents put their pecuniary in-
terest ahead of their clients' better interest. Armed with cash, cars,
plane tickets and jewelry, these agents duped a number of naive
student-athletes into signing agency contracts prior to the expira-
tion of their collegiate eligibility. In turn, several of these student-
athletes became ineligible. 5  Simultaneously, the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") sanctioned their academic
3. For a complete breakdown of the registration and renewal fees associated
with each UAAA and non-UAAA state and territory, see Appendix B.
4. Despite this article's focus on the contract advisor industry and the NFLPA,
the inherent problems caused by the UAAA, SPARTA and state registration fees
apply equally, if not greater, to those who represent professional basketball, base-
ball and hockey players. This article's focus on football illustrates a point that is
widely applicable in sports and entertainment law.
5. See William E. Kirwan, Protecting College Athletes from Unscrupulous Agents, at
http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/enforcement/agents/sajinfo/agentPacket.
html#chronicalArticle (Sept. 26, 1996) (indicating how some student athletes lost
their eligibility to unscrupulous agents). The NCAA bylaws that are most relevant
to ineligibility are the following:
20051
3
Remick and Cabott: Keeping out the Little Guy: An Older Contract Advisor's Concern,
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
4 VILLANOVA SPORTS & EN'. LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12: p. 1
institutions for playing them in intercollegiate competition despite
12.1.1 Amateur status. An individual loses amateur status and thus
shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if
the individual: ...
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of
expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional
sports organization based upon athletic skill or participation, except as
permitted by NCAA rules and regulations.
12.2.4.3. .. An individual who retains an agent shall lose amateur
status.
12.3.1 General Rule. An individual shall be ineligible for participation
in an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writ-
ing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or
her athletic ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an agency con-
tract not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall
be deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible
to participate in any sport.
12.3.1.1 Representation for Future Negotiations. An individual shall be
ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she enters into a verbal or written
agreement with an agent for representation in future professional sport
negotiations that are to take place after the individual has completed his
or her eligibility in that sport.
12.3.1.2 Benefits from Prospective Agents. An individual shall be ineligi-
ble per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she (or his or her relatives or friends) accepts
transportation or other benefits from: ...
(b) An agent, even if the agent has indicated that he or she has
no interest in representing the student-athlete in the marketing of his or
her athletic ability or reputation and does not represent individuals in
the student-athlete's sport.
31.2.2.4 Participation While Ineligible. When a student-athlete compet-
ing as an individual or representing the institution in a team champion-
ship is declared ineligible subsequent to the competition, or a penalty has
been imposed or action as set forth in Bylaw 19.5.2.2-(e) or 19.7 of the
NCAA enforcement program, the Committee on Infractions may require
the following:
(a) Individual Competition. The individual's performance may be
stricken from the championship records, the points the student has con-
tributed to the team's total may be deleted, the team standings may be
adjusted accordingly, and any awards involved may be returned to the
Association. For those championships in which individual results are re-
corded by time, points or stroke totals (i.e., cross country, golf, gymnas-
tics, indoor track and field, outdoor track and field, rifle, swimming and
skiing), the placement of other competitors may be altered and awards
presented accordingly. For those championships in which individual re-
sults are recorded by advancement through a bracket or head-to-head
competition, the placement of other competitors shall not be altered.
(b) Team Competition. The record of the team's performance
may be deleted, the team's place in the final standings may be vacated,
and the team's trophy and the ineligible student's award may be returned
to the Association.
2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL: CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS,
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their ineligibility. 6 In a few cases, unethical agents defrauded their
clients out of millions. 7 In order to prevent further ineligibility and
sanctions, a number of states enacted athlete agent regulations. 8
Unfortunately, a majority of these laws lacked registration require-
ments and enforcement penalties.9 Thus, dubious agents often
went unidentified and unpunished.
In response to the need for efficient agent regulation, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NC-
CUSL") drafted the UAAA. 1° Soon thereafter, Congressmen Tom
Osborne and Bart Gordon authored SPARTA. Additionally, the
NFLPA enacted the Rules Governing Contract Advisors ("RGCA").
The background of each regulation is discussed below.
A. UAAA
In 1997, the NCAA and several major universities asked the
NCCUSL to draft a model uniform agent regulation.1 In response,
the NCCUSL drafted the UAAA in Fall 2000. The purpose of the
UAAA is to regulate agents, protect academic institutions from
6. See Kirwan, supra note 7 (discussing NCAA sanctions on academic institu-
tions for playing ineligible student athletes in intercollegiate competition). The
NCAA bylaw that is most relevant to sanctions is 31.2.2.5 Institutional Penalty for
Ineligible Participation, which states: "When an ineligible student-athlete participates
in an NCAA championship and the student-athlete or the institution knew or had
reason to know of the ineligibility, the NCAA Committee on Infractions may assess
a financial penalty." 2003-04 NCAA Manual, supra note 7.
7. See Marc Jenkins, Note, The United Student-Athletes of America: Should College
Athletes Organize in Order to Protect Their Rights and Address the Ills of Intercollegiate
Athletics?, 5 VAND.J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 39, 42 (2003) (discussing Tank Black-Univer-
sity of Florida scandal).
8. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2000)
(noting approximately twenty-eight states enacted statutes regulating athlete
agents).
9. See id. (indicating regulatory laws do not have uniform registration require-
ments and penalties). "There are substantial differences in the registration proce-
dures, disclosures required and requirements relating to record maintenance,
reporting, renewal, notice, warning and security." Id.
10. See Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA) History and Status, at http://
wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/enforcement/agents/uaaa/history.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2004) [hereinafter UAAA History] (noting what NCCUSL is and its pur-
pose). "NCCUSL is a national organization that drafts uniform and model state
laws and comprises more than 300 lawyers, judges, state legislators and law profes-
sors appointed by their respective states." Id.
11. See id. (noting number of states and territories adopting UAAA as their
primary form of agent regulation). The NCAA and several universities were
prompted by the lack of uniformity and lack of reciprocity. See UNIF. ATHLETE
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sanctions and reduce student-athlete ineligibility.12 As of Fall 2004,
twenty-eight states and two territories have adopted the UAAA as
their primary form of agent regulation.
13
To regulate agents, the UAAA imposes numerous require-
ments. First, agents must register with the state prior to contacting
a student-athlete.1 4 Second, they must disclose their professional
and criminal history.1 5 Third, agents must grant the Secretary of
State the authority to issue subpoenas if compliance information is
needed.1 6 Finally, the UAAA prohibits agents from funneling
money or tangible benefits to student-athletes.1 7 Those who violate
these regulations are subject to criminal and administrative
penalties.
1 8
The UAAA protects academic institutions by allowing them to
seek civil remedies from both agents and student-athletes if they are
sanctioned due to an agent, or a student-athlete's failure to notify
their athletic director regarding a signed agency contract within the
appropriate period of time.19
To reduce ineligibility, agents must provide student-athletes
with an ineligibility warning at the bottom of every agency con-
tract. 20 Once an agency contract is signed, the agent and the stu-
dent-athlete must forward written notice of the contractual
12. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS AcT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2000)
(discussing UAAA purpose).
13. See UAAA History, supra note 12 (noting number of states and territories
adopting UAAA as their primary form of agent regulation). For a further list of
states adopting the UAAA, see Appendix A.
14. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS AcT § 4(a), 7 U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 2000) (stating
agents must register with state prior to contacting student-athlete). On the other
hand, under § 4(b)(1) and (2), if the student-athlete initiates the contact, the
agent may still discuss representation with the athlete, providing that he or she
registers in the state of the student-athlete's academic residence within seven days.
See § 4(b) (1)-(2), 7 U.L.A. 200.
15. See §§ 5(a)(3), (8), 7 U.L.A. 201-02 (explaining agents must fully disclose
professional and criminal history).
16. See § 3(b), 7 U.L.A. 198 (showing agents must grant secretary of state au-
thority to issue subpoenas).
17. See § 14(a)(2)-(3), 7 U.L.A. 219 (noting agents must not induce student-
athlete into contract).
18. See §§ 15, 17, 7 U.L.A. 221, 224 (describing agents who violate UAAA regu-
lations are subject to penalties).
19. See § 16, 7 U.L.A. 223 (stating civil remedies available to academic institu-
tions against student athletes and agents).
20. See § 10(c), 7 U.L.A. 213-14 (stating agency contract must contain conspic-
uous notice in boldface type in capital letters). The agency contract must state:
WARNING TO STUDENT-ATHLETE
IF YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT:
(1) YOU MAY LOSE YOUR ELIGIBILITY TO COMPETE AS A STU-
DENT-ATHLETE IN YOUR SPORT,
[Vol. 12: p. I
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relationship to the athletic director at the student-athlete's aca-
demic institution, or to any institution the agent reasonably believes
the student-athlete will attend.21 Such notice must be given within
the lesser of 72 hours or the student-athlete's next scheduled ath-
letic event. 22 Simultaneously, the UAAA gives student-athletes the
right to cancel agency contracts within fourteen days of
execution. 23
Ironically, the UAAA does not provide student-athletes with a
right to seek civil remedies from agents if they are rendered ineligi-
ble due to an agent's failure to abide by UAAA regulations. Addi-
tionally, its safeguards do not apply to student-athletes who have
exhausted their eligibility.24 Lastly, registration fees vary amongst
member states because the UAAA fails to establish a uniform regis-
tration fee.
B. SPARTA
The House of Representatives passed SPARTA on June 4,
2003.25 Soon thereafter, Senator Ron Wyden (D-Or.) filed an iden-
tical bill in the Senate. 26 On September 24, 2004, President George
(2) IF YOU HAVE ANATHLETIC DIRECTOR, WITHIN 72 HOURS OFENTERING INTO THIS CONTRACT, BOTH YOU AND YOURATHLETE AGENT MUST NOTIFY YOUR ATHLETIC DIRECTOR;
AND
(3) YOU MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT WITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER
SIGNING IT. CANCELLATION OF THIS CONTRACT MAY NOT
REINSTATE YOUR ELIGIBILITY
Id. (emphasis in original).
21. See § 11(a)-(b), 7 U.L.A. 216 (noting written notice must be forwarded to
academic institution).
22. See id. (indicating notice requirement time limit).
23. See § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 217 (indicating right to cancel).
24. See R. Michael Rogers, The Uniform Athlete Agent Act Fails to Fully Protect theCollege Athlete Who Exhausts His Eligibility Before Turning Professiona 2 VA. SPORTS &ENT. L.J. 63, 69-73 (2002) (explaining how UAAA affects "Exhausted EligibilityAthlete[s]"). The exhausted eligibility student-athlete is one who has used all fouryears of eligibility in his or her sport, but still remains on campus as a student. Seeid. at 69 (stating UAAA provides that if "an individual is permanently ineligible toparticipate in a particular intercollegiate sport, the individual is not a student-ath-lete for purposes of that sport") (emphasis in original). For example, Brian West-brook, now a running back with the Philadelphia Eagles, was an exhaustedeligibility student-athlete during the spring semester following his last season of
college football at Villanova. See id. at 70.
25. See Gary Roberts, An Overview of the Recent Legal Developments in Sports,SPORTS LAwYERs Assoc. CONFERENCE 5 (Sports Lawyers Assoc. Tul. Law), May 20-22, 2004 (indicating how SPARTA came about in Federal legislature).
26. See id. (referring to bill in Senate that resembles Sports Agent Responsibil-
ity and Trust Act).
2005]
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W. Bush signed SPARTA into law.27 SPARTA serves as a "federal
backstop" to the UAAA, as it focuses on regulation and
enforcement.
28
In terms of regulation, SPARTA makes it unlawful for an agent
to provide student-athletes with false or misleading information,
promises or representations, or anything of value. 29 Additionally,
agents must warn student-athletes in a disclosure form that they
may lose their eligibility if they sign an agency contract or falsify its
date. 30 Before entering into the agency contract, student-athletes
must sign the disclosure form. 31 Once the agency contract is
signed, both the agent and the athlete must contact the institu-
tion's athletic department within the lesser of 72 hours or the stu-
dent-athlete's next scheduled athletic event.
3 2
Seeking strict enforcement, SPARTA has the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") enforce its agency contract regulations.
3 3
27. Sports Agent Responsibility & Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 108-304, 118 Stat.
1125 (2004) (enacted 108 H.R. 361).
28. Federal Legislation Restricting Sports Agents Moves Forvard, LEGAL ISSUES IN
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, Aug. 2002, at 1 (quoting U.S. Representative Tom Os-
borne who was University of Nebraska football coach before serving in Congress).
SPARTA is an "attempt to prevent agents from bribing student-athletes with expen-
sive gifts and cash in exchange for the student's signing of a representation con-
tract." Id. (indicating central goal of legislation).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 2 (2003) (discussing § 3(a)(1)(A)-(B)
and agent regulation regarding misleading information). Prohibitions include
"any consideration in the form of a loan, or acting in the capacity of a guarantor or
co-guarantor for any debt ...." Id. (discussing extent of statute).
30. See id. at 2-3 (discussing § 3(b)(3) and disclosure forms). The warning
must be conspicuous and in boldface type state the following:
Warning to Student Athlete: If you agree orally or in writing to be repre-
sented by an agent now or in the future you may lose your eligibility to
compete as a student athlete in your sport. Within 72 hours after enter-
ing into this contract or before the next athletic event in which you are
eligible to participate, whichever occurs first, both you and the agent by
whom you are agreeing to be represented must notify the athletic direc-
tor of the educational institution at which you are enrolled, or other indi-
vidual responsible for athletic programs at such educational institution,
that you have entered into an agency contract.
Id.
31. See id. at 2 (describing § 3(b) (2) and relevant disclosure forms). If the
student-athlete is under the age of 18, the parent or guardian must sign the con-
tract. Id. (indicating consent required by SPARTA).
32. See id. at 4 (explaining § 6(a) and its instructions on contacting student
institutions).
33. See id. at 3 (setting forth § 4(a) and pertinent FTC regulation). "The
Commission shall enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and
with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.) were incor-
porated into and made a part of this Act." Id. (providing instructions for the ap-
propriate government agency under § 4(b)).
[Vol. 12: p. I
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Specifically, SPARTA gives the FTC the authority to "enforce
[SPARTA] in the same manner, by the same means, and with the
same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms
and provisions of the [FTC] Act were incorporated into and made a
part of this Act."34 Accordingly, the FTC fines agents $11,000 per
incident for unfair or deceptive acts or practices that violate
SPARTA. 35 The revenue generated from such fines is forwarded to
the U.S. Treasury.
3 6
SPARTA also permits state attorney generals to act in federal
court on behalf of the FTC.3 7 In these cases, all damages, restitu-
tion and other compensation go to the state.38 A state also has a
cause of action on behalf of its residents if it has reason to believe
that an agent has threatened or adversely affected a resident's
interest.39
Academic institutions may also seek remedial damages from
student-athletes or agents if their behavior causes it to incur ex-
penses.40 These expenses include losses resulting from penalties,
disqualification, suspension and/or restitution for losses suffered
due to self-imposed compliance actions.4' Remedies for such suits
include enjoinder, enforcement, damages and restitution.
42
SPARTA does not, however, address registration fees or provide stu-
dent-athletes with a cause of action if they are injured due to an
agent's misconduct.
43
34. H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 3 (noting § 4(b) and FTC authority con-
cerning enforcement of SPARTA).
35. See Crissy Kaesebier, Federal bill designed to provide second line of agent defense,
NCAA NEws, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2002/20020527/active/3911n37.html
(May 27, 2002) (discussing FTC fines and SPARTA).
36. See id. (indicating where money netted from fines gets placed).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 3 (2003) (discussing § 5(a)(1) and state
attorney general abilities to enforce FTC fines).
38. See id. (referring to § 5(a) (1) (C) and state damages).
39. See id. (describing § 5(a) (1) and state causes of action). "In any case in
which the attorney general of a State has reason to believe that an interest of the
residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely affected by the en-
gagement of any athlete agent in a practice that violates section 3 of this Act...
Id.
40. See id. at 4 (describing § 6(b) (1) and remedial damages). "An educa-
tional institution has a right of action against an athlete agent for damages caused
by a violation of this Act." Id.
41. See id. (discussing § 6(b)(2) and damages).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 3 (2003) (discussing § 5(a)(1)(A)-(C)
and remedies for academic institutions).
43. See Scott Boras, Agent reform plan just a first step, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
Bus. J., Jan. 26 - Feb. 1, 2004, at 25 (noting downfalls of SPARTA). Recently,
athlete agent Scott Boras was called before Congress to testify in regard to
SPARTA. See id. Boras stated that while he supports the bill, he is calling for an
2005]
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C. RGCA
In 1994, the Officers and Player Representatives of the NFLPA
adopted the RGCA for persons who desired to assist or represent
players in their contract negotiations with NFL Clubs.44 The
NFLPA refers to these persons as contract advisors. The RGCA
were adopted and amended pursuant to the authority and duty
conferred upon the NFLPA as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of NFL players, under Section 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
45
To be eligible for contract advisor certification, the following
requirements must be met. One must file a verified application for
certification, execute an information release with the NFLPA, and
pay the required application fee. 46 Currently, that fee is $1,600.47
In addition, one must have received a degree from an accredited
four-year college or university.48 The NFLPA will grant an excep-
tion, however, if the applicant has sufficient negotiating experi-
ence. 49 Furthermore, new applicants must attend the annual
NFLPA seminar for new contract advisors and pass a written certifi-
cation exam.50
Certification is only granted to individuals and not firms, cor-
porations, partnerships, or other business entities.51 There is no
limit, however, on the number of individuals in any one firm, cor-
poration, partnership or other business entity who may be eligible
expansion to provide relief directly to the student-athlete in addition to the univer-
sity. See id.
44. See generally NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N (NFLPA) REGS. GOV-
ERNING CONTRACT ADvisoRs (amended Nov. 2003) [hereinafter NFLPA Regulations]
(describing origin of RGCA), available at http://www.nflpa.org/Agents/
main.asp?subPage=Agent+Regulations.
45. See id. (describing RGCA origin). Section 9(a) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act ("NLRA") states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rate of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2004).
46. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2 (describing process to become
eligible for contract advisor certification).
47. See NELPA Application for Certification Checklist, at http://www.nflpa.org/
PDFs/Agents/AgentApplicationOnline.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (noting ap-
plication fee).
48. See NELPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2(A) (describing another re-
quirement for new contract advisors).
49. See id. (stating exception to college degree requirement).
50. See id. (noting another requirement for new contract advisors).
51. See id. (stating who is eligible for certification).
[Vol. 12: p. 1
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for certification. 52 Once certified, one must pay an annual fee,
which is currently $1,200.
53
The RGCA seek to ensure that players make informed deci-
sions when they select a contract advisor; therefore, they establish
contract advisor standards and regulations.54 Contract advisors
must adhere to the following standards. First, they must disclose
their qualifications on their certification applications, permit
outside audits, and act at all times in a fiduciary capacity on behalf
of players. 55 Second, they may only conduct individual negotiations
on behalf of a player if they sign a Standard Representation Agree-
ment with the player, file a fully executed copy of that agreement
with the NFLPA and receive certification from the NFLPA.5
6 These
standards also govern providing players with advice, counsel, infor-
mation and/or assistance with respect to their Club contracts, as
well as their conduct during compensation negotiations and any
other activity that bears directly upon the contract advisor's integ-
rity, competence or ability to negotiate contracts.5 7 Such activities
include wealth management, tax counseling and preparation, fi-
nancial advice and investment services.
58
Turning to regulations, the RGCA regulate agency contracts
heavily. Accordingly, any agreement which does not meet NFLPA
standards is unenforceable and the contract advisor does not have a
right to receive compensation from it. 5 9 Further, the Standard
Player Agreement caps contract advisors' commission at three per-
cent of the player's performance compensation. 60 Simultaneously,
a contract advisor may not receive his or her commission until after
52. See id. (noting loophole in certification process).
53. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2(H) (2) (noting annual fee re-
quirement); see also NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N ANNUAL RENEWAL AP-
PLICATION (2004) (stating annual fee) (on file with author).
54. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 3 (explaining purpose of
RGCA).
55. See id. at § 3(A)(1)-(17) (describing standards contract advisors must
meet).
56. See id. at § I(A) (explaining standards contract advisors must follow).
57. See id. (noting RGCA standards apply to many contract advisor activities
concerning their clients).
58. See id. (explaining various contract advisor activities that are governed by
RGCA standards).
59. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 4(A) (explaining effect when
NFLPA standards are not met).
60. See id. at § 4(B) (noting performance compensation includes salaries,
signing bonuses, reporting bonuses, roster bonuses, and any performance bonuses
earned during term of contract). An example of compensation not included
under this provision would be honor bonuses, such as "All Pro", "Pro Bowl", or
"Rookie of the Year." Id.
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the player receives compensation. 61 If the player decides otherwise,
however, the contract advisor may receive the commission up
front.
62
The RGCA prohibits a variety of contract advisor activities.
Contract advisors are prohibited from soliciting players through
money or merchandise, negotiating player contracts that violate
NFLPA policy, concealing material facts from players, filing a law-
suit against a player as opposed to using arbitration, and sharing
commissions with other contract advisors. 63 Additionally, contract
advisors may not initiate discussions with players about their cur-
rent contract advisor agreement or NFL Club contract. 64 If the
player initiates the contact, however, the contract advisor may com-
municate with the player regarding the agreements. 65
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedures, requirements, fees
and prohibitions under Section 2(g), a contract advisor's certifica-
tion automatically expires at the end of any three-year period, in
which he or she fails to negotiate and sign a player to a NFL con-
tract.66 Practice squad contract negotiations do not count for the
purposes of Section 2(g) .67 Similarly, the NFLPA's legal depart-
ment is researching the feasibility of adopting an amendment that




The UAAA, SPARTA, and Section 2(g) cause three problems.
First, they do not protect student-athletes with exhausted eligibility.
Second, they do not provide students with the right to bring an
action against unscrupulous agents. Third, they produce unfair
fees and reduce professional business intimacy. Professor R.
61. See id. at § 4 (describing compensation process).
62. See id. (noting exception to how contract advisor is compensated).
63. See id. at § 3(B) (1)-(27) (describing prohibited RGCA behavior).
64. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 3(B) (21) (a) (stating another
RGCA requirement which contract advisors must follow).
65. See id. at § 3(B) (21) (b) (noting exception to requirement § 3(B) (21) (a)).
66. See id. at § 2(6) (explaining term limit concerning certification of contract
advisors).
67. See id. (stating which types of players count to meet standards of RGCA).
68. Memorandum from Tom DePaso, National Football League Players Asso-
ciation, on 2004 Amendments to the NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Ad-
visors, to the Contract Advisors (May 18, 2004) (on file with Villanova Sports &
Entertainment LawJournal) (describing 2004 amendments to regulations, specifi-
cally, NFLPA's legal department).
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Michael Rogers addressed the first problem two years ago.69 Jeremy
Bloom is tackling the second issue. 70 Thus, I will discuss the third
problem exclusively.
The contract advisor industry needs improvement. The status
quo is harming NFL players, even though a majority of it is honest
and law abiding. Recently, the NFLPA reported that agents, busi-
ness partners, and financial advisors cheated seventy-eight NFL
players out of more than $42,000,000 in 2002.71 Recognizing this
harm, it is clear that the industry needs young aspiring contract
advisors. They are our future leaders, possessing the energy and
motivation needed to fight unethical behavior. The irony is that
fight is the desired end of the UAAA, SPARTA, and RGCA. Unfor-
tunately, the excessive financial considerations they produce stifle
that fight by barring aspiring contract advisors from competing in
the multi-state game.
A. The Multi-State Game
Sports are everywhere. Consequently, athlete representation is
a multi-state game. Today forty-nine of the fifty states have col-
legiate football programs. 72 Moreover, this past 2003-04 NFL sea-
son, forty-eight of those forty-nine states were represented on the
active NFL league roster per the various players' undergraduate in-
69. See Rogers, supra note 26, at 69-73 (discussing shortcomings of Uniform
Athlete Agent Act). Professor Rogers's article examines the UAAA's definition of
"student-athlete" and its limitation to those students with remaining eligibility. See
id. at 65 (defining "student-athlete" under UAAA and its limits). Professor Rogers
proposes that the definition be modified to apply to all student-athletes including
seniors whose eligibility is exhausted, as they too need protection from unscrupu-
lous agents. See id. at 78-79 (describing proposal for changes to UAAA).
70. University of Colorado wide receiver and Olympic skierJeremy Bloom is
fighting to equip student-athletes with more rights. Bloom, in association with Cal-
ifornia Senator Kevin Murray, drafted the Student Athlete's Bill of Rights
("SABR"). See generally S. 193, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). SABR proposes
that a university not be bound to the "rules or policies of any organization .... nor
make a contract with any party, that dictates the terms, value, and conditions of
student athlete scholarships .... " Id. at § 67371. Most importantly, the SABR
would provide a stipend to cover the full cost of attending college, which includes
$2,400 extra for necessary travel, out of season medical expenses, clothing and
leisure activities. See Andrew Zimbalist, Jeremy Bloom can guide NCAA to logical reform,
STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Feb. 9 - 15, 2004, at 31 (discussing Bloom's Cali-
fornia bill in relation to NCAA amateurism difficulties).
71. Letter from Alan M. Rothstein, CPA, PFS, Vice President, Asset Strategies
Inc., to Lloyd Z. Remick, Esq., President, Zane Management, Inc. (June 10, 2004)
(on file with author) (stating need for improvement in contract advisor industry).
72. Alaska is the exception. See Peter Wolf & Ross Baker, College football team
homepages (by state), at http://www.bol.ucla.edu/-prwolfe/cfootball/LinksList.html
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stitutions. 73 The average number of states represented per team
was twenty-eight.7 4 Viewing these statistics, it becomes clear that
young contract advisors must register in as many states as possible,
because only registering in one or two states severely limits his or
her ability to obtain clients; hence, the phrase "the multi-state
game."
The UAAA is a direct result of the multi-state game. Prior to its
drafting, a number of agents lobbied for uniform registration, as
they were spending hours upon hours executing several unique
state licensure applications. 75 The NCCUSL acknowledged their
complaints when it included uniform registration procedures in the
UAAA. Despite recognizing this need, the NCCUSL failed to estab-
lish a uniform registration fee. Thus, each UAAA member state has
its own separate fee. Currently, registration fees range from $20 to
$2,500, with a mean of $1,260 and an average of $459.76 Since nine
of the twenty-eight UAAA states and territories reduced their re-
newal registration fee, the average renewal registration fee drops
slightly to $414. 7 7 Three states offer reduced registration fees for
registration based upon a certificate of registration or licensure is-
73. Vermont was not represented this past season. Such data was compiled
through a roster review of each NFL player's undergraduate institution. Roster
information is available through each team's link at www.nfl.com.
74. Such data was compiled through a roster review of each NFL player's un-
dergraduate institution. Roster information is available through each team's link
at www.nfl.com. For a breakdown of the number of states represented on each
team's roster, see Appendix C.
75. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT AcT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2000)
(describing need for uniform registration). The drafters of the UAAA note that
"[c]onscientious agents operating in more than a single State must have night-
mares caused by the lack of uniformity in the existing statutes, the difficulty in
compliance and the severity of penalties which may be imposed for violations." Id.;
see also Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millenium: State
Statutes and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 276
(2001) (discussing tenuous state of athlete agent legislation).
76. For a complete breakdown of the registration and renewal fees associated
with each UAAA and non-UAAA state and territory, see Appendix B.
77. Those states are Alabama (ALA. CODE § 8-26A-9 (2002)); Florida (FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 468.453 (West 2001)); Kentucky (Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.6915
(Michie Supp. 2004)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 81A.09 (West Supp. 2004));
Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-42-17 (2004)); New York (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§ 8 9 9 -g (McKinney Supp. 2004)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-15.1.08
(Supp. 2003)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2130 (2002)); and West Vir-
ginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-39-9 (Michie 2002)). For state statute information,
see UAAA History, supra note 12. For a complete breakdown of the registration and
renewal fees associated with each UAAA and non-UAAA state and territory, see
Appendix B.
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sued by another UAAA state. 78 Interestingly, the NCCUSL stated in
the UAAA that:
The amount of [registration] fees is left for each State to
determine. Some States with existing acts have set fees in
amounts sufficient to recover the cost of administration.
If that approach is taken, a fee for registration or renewal
based on registration or renewal of registration in another
State should be less than when a complete evaluation and
review of an application is necessary.
79
Despite these guidelines, only the foregoing few states follow them;
hence, the present problems persist.
In addition, two states offer registration advantages for busi-
ness organizations. In Pennsylvania, individuals pay a registration
fee of $200, while corporations pay a registration fee of $400.80 In-
dividuals registering in Texas pay $1,000, but individuals who work
for a business entity only pay $100.81 These registration fees, when
combined with SPARTA's failure to address the subject and Section
2(g)'s ouster clause, are unfair because they create an environment
that places beginning contract advisors at a significant competitive
advantage. Simultaneously, these fees reduce the professional busi-
ness intimacy associated with contract advisor-client relations.
B. Unfairness
The UAAA, SPARTA, Section 2(g) and the myriad of state re-
gistration fees are unfair. As mentioned, aspiring contract advisors
must pay a separate registration fee in every state. In the multi-state
game, fees and expenses accumulate quickly. The average begin-
ning contract advisor cannot afford these expenses, because he or
she is most likely in the midst of paying the annual NFLPA fee,
repaying student loans, making mortgage payments, paying off a
car, starting a family and facing practice overhead.
As a result, aspiring contract advisors with law degrees are
forced, while simultaneously being lucky to at least have the chance
78. Those states are Alabama, Arkansas and Pennsylvania. See ALA. CODE § 8-
26A-9 (2002); see also Apu. CODE ANN. § 17-16-109 (2001); 5 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3308 (West Supp. 2004). For state statute information, see UAAA History, supra
note 12.
79. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 9, 7 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 2000) (stating
how registration fees are determined state by state).
80. See5 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3308(a) (1) (West Supp. 2004) (noting mone-
tary differences between individuals and corporations).
81. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2051.107 (Vernon 2004) (detailing fees of in-
dividuals and those affiliated with corporations).
20051
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to work, in the District Attorney's Office, Public Defender's Office
or a law firm. There, they can at least receive a steady paycheck.
Deadlines, billable hours, mortgage payments and familial needs,
however, create congested schedules and long hours.
Similarly, non-lawyer agents find work elsewhere, but often
times they fall victim to the same schedules and hours. Conse-
quently, these young men and women put their dreams of becom-
ing a NFLPA contract advisor on hold, while they try to make ends
meet. Most times these dreams are never re-visited.
Quantity breeds quality. Therefore, if we allow more contract
advisors into the NFLPA it will help improve the industry. Under
this approach, the aspiring agents of today will become the ethical
status quo of tomorrow. Simultaneously, the industry will become
more service oriented and better geared toward the needs of ath-
letes. This evolution is impossible, however, if contract advisors
continue to be subject to the exorbitant registration fees that the
UAAA produces.
SPARTA does not help the problem. As written, it is silent on
the issue of registration fees. Ironically, while it recognizes the
need for federal regulation, it fails to ensure a fair and reasonable
means of registration.
Section 2(g) adds to the unfairness because it gives the NFLPA
a license to strip an agent of his or her certification. Interestingly,
Section 2(g) disrobes contract advisors of their certification while
they abide by NFLPA requirements, pay membership fees, attend
annual meetings, and compete with their 900 plus brother and sis-
ter agents. 8 2 In effect, Section 2 (g) rebuts the pillars of laissez-faire,
by limiting competition and depriving one the opportunity to work
in the field of his or her choice.
Some may argue that football player representation is not a
binding concern. Preventing people from working in the field of
their choice, however, frustrates the fundamental freedoms of our
nation, and maintaining the American way is always a concern.
C. The Reduction of Professional Business Intimacy
Alternatively, some young men and women sidestep the unfair-
ness, debt and hustle by joining large agencies, which are full of
divisions, departments and specialized sectors.
82. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N CERTIFIED CONTRACT ADVISORS
DIRECTORY 240-54 (2004) (listing NFLPA agents).
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The product of these large agencies is scattered representa-
tion, under which an athlete speaks to one person for this and an-
other person for that, phone tag becomes the communication
norm, and face to face, one-on-one meetings are phased out. As
the RGCA notes, contract advisors serve their clients in a fiduciary
capacity.8 3 When one owes another a fiduciary duty, trust and the
other's better interest are at the nerve center of the fiduciary's
every decision. The fiduciary duty an agent owes an athlete is
uniquely intimate and requires an unusually high degree of trust.
Lawyers, accountants, personal managers, business managers
and booking agents all serve their clients in a fiduciary capacity.
When an agent represents an athlete, many of the aforementioned
jobs and relationships are combined into one. Typically, agents
handle their client's business affairs and wealth like that of an ac-
countant or business manager. Additionally, they publicize and
promote their clients, and provide them with long term planning
(similar to that of a personal manager). Further, they seek employ-
ment on behalf of their clients through endorsements, sponsor-
ships and speaking engagements much like that of a booking agent.
Lastly, they negotiate their client's contracts and if the agent is a
lawyer, he or she may very well aid in the drafting process. Athletes
trust that these services will increase their value in the market, ease
the transition from the playing field to the booth, and lead towards
a prominent retirement.
These services are very intimate and personal, and in order to
tailor them properly an agent must communicate with his or her
client regularly.8 4 Providing intimate and personal services comes
83. See ATLPA Regulations, supra note 46, at § 3(A) (1)-(17) (describing rela-
tionship between contract advisors and their clients).
84. SeeMODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 - 1.18 (amended 2003) (pro-
viding ethical rules for attorneys). If the agent is a lawyer, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct further regulate his or her practice. The Rules most applica-
ble to agent/lawyers are the following:
Rule 1.1 requires that agent/lawyers provide their clients with competent,
skilled, knowledgeable, thorough, and prepared representation. See id. at 1.1.
Rule 1.2 requires that agent/lawyers allow their clients to set the ends of the
relationship. See id. at 1.2. The agent/lawyer is then required to consult with the
athlete as to the means he or she intends to use in meeting the ends. See id. This
rule also allows the agent/lawyer to limit the scope of the representation, if a limi-
tation is reasonable under the circumstances and the athlete gives informed writ-
ten consent. See id. at 1.2(c). Informed consent means that the client is fully aware
of the ramifications of any decisions made. See id. at 1.0(e) (stating definitions).
Finally, this rule prohibits an agent/lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in
regard to criminal or fraudulent behavior. See id. at 1.2(d).
Rule 1.3 requires that an agent/lawyer act reasonably, diligently, and
promptly when representing his or her client. See id. at 1.3.
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naturally to a sole practitioner, but less naturally to a large agency
with multiple departments, sectors and junior agents. It is easier
for a sole practitioner to establish trust with an athlete because he
or she can "hold the client's hand" and tailor services directly to-
ward the needs of the athlete. Although the variety of service a
large agency offers a player is valuable and cannot be discounted,
the core of the industry is professional business intimacy.
Unfortunately, exorbitant registration fees and the multi-state
game, make it difficult for sole practitioners to provide business in-
timacy. As a result, large agencies are becoming the norm in the
agent industry. The 2004 NFL draft provides a fine illustration.
Rule 1.4 requires that an agent/lawyer inform his or her athlete client of the
ramifications associated with any consensual decision the athlete makes. See id. at
1.4. This rule requires that the agent/lawyer inform the client about the status of
all relevant matters promptly. See id.
Rule 1.5 requires that agent/lawyers keep fees reasonable. See id. at 1.5. If a
fee is contingent, the agent/lawyer must present it to the athlete in writing. See id.
at 1.5(c). Further, if fees are split with other agent/lawyers, the division must be in
proportion to the services provided, the total fee must be reasonable, and the ath-
lete client must agree to such division in writing. See id. at 1.5(e). This fee rule is
very important in sports like Major League Baseball where the Players' Association
collective bargaining agreement does not limit agents' fees and allows them to be
negotiated freely.
Rule 1.6 requires that the agent/lawyer keep all information relating to repre-
sentation of the athlete client confidential unless the athlete gives informed con-
sent, or disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death, substantial
bodily harm, criminal activity, fraud that will most likely result in substantial injury
to the financial interests of another, or to secure legal advice about the agent/
lawyer's compliance with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, establish a de-
fense on behalf of the agent/lawyer, or to comply with another law or court order.
See id. at 1.6.
Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.18, require that the agent/lawyer not represent an ath-
lete if such representation will cause a conflict of interest with another current,
former, or potential client. See id. at 1.7, 1.8, 1.9. If the current, former, or poten-
tial client gives informed written consent, the agent/lawyer may represent the ath-
lete in most situations. See id.
Rule 1.8 requires that an agent/lawyer not enter into a business transaction
with an athlete client unless the transaction and terms on which the lawyer ac-
quires the interest are fair and reasonable, the athlete client is informed in writing
about the opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel on the transac-
tion, and the client gives informed consent. See id. at 1.8. Additionally, the agent/
lawyer shall not use information relating to the representation of the athlete client
to her disadvantage unless he or she gives informed consent. See id. at 1.8(b).
Further, the agent/lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from the client or
testamentary gift, or prepare such a gift. See id. at 1.8(c). Lastly, prior to the con-
clusion of such representation, the agent/lawyer shall not make or negotiate an
agreement that gives the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal based on the
representation. See id. at 1.8(d).
Rule 1.10 states that if an agent/lawyer is in a firm and he or she is disquali-
fied from representing an athlete due to a conflict with a potential client, the en-
tire firm is disqualified through imputation. See id. at 1.10.
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Out of the 224 players drafted in the traditional seven rounds,
seventeen agencies had at least five or more players, for a total of
117 between them.8 5 As mentioned, there are over 900 certified
contract advisors registered with the NFLPA.86 Thus, approxi-
mately 890 contract advisors compete for the remaining 107
athletes.
Competition is the backbone of American business and many
would consider the 2004 draft's ferocious level of competition as
business at its finest. They are wrong, however, because the compe-
tition there was not fair, courtesy of unaffordable registration fees.
As alluded to earlier, such unfairness is causing mergers and
large-scale representation. Unfortunately, often times when a large
agency represents an athlete, the athlete is in danger of becoming a
number, instead of being a client with individual needs and charac-
teristics. In the end, professional business intimacy is reduced.
Inadvertently, Section 2(g) furthers the move toward large
agency representation, because partners in large agencies can as-
sign clients to a contract advisor employee, who may have failed to
sign a roster player on his or her own. Basically, a large firm can
"spread" its clientele to ensure that none of its employees lose their
certification. A sole practitioner does not have that luxury.
Before outlining the solution, we offer a word of caution. Big
business domination leads to conglomeration, and conglomeration
can be dangerous. One example is the music industry. Every time
two major labels merge, thousands lose their jobs, from the senior
executives at the top to the recording studio custodians at the bot-
tom. In order to prevent a similar occurrence in the agent indus-
try, we propose the following solution.
IV. SOLUTION
In order to assure fairness and reinforce professional business
intimacy, the industry needs an affordable federal licensure for ath-
85. See Len Pasquarelli, Ind. firm represents four first-rounders, ESPN.CoM, at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=Pasquarellilen&id=
1809767 (May 26, 2004) (stating breakdown of firms that had at least five clients
selected in traditional seven rounds, as follows: Domann & Pittman - 9, Octagon -
9, Priority Sports and Entertainment - 9, Rosenhaus Sports - 8, Sportstars - 8,
ARM - 8, Maximum Sports - 8, Joel Segal - 8, SFX Sports - 7, Pro Sports & En-
tertainment - 4, IMG Football - 4).
86. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N CERTIFIED CONTRACT ADVISORS
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lete agents. The solution can be achieved in three steps: modifying
the UAAA, amending SPARTA and revising Section 2(g).
A. Modifying the UAAA
The first step toward affordable federal athlete agent licensure
is modifying the UAAA. As written, the means of registration are
uniform, but registration fees are not. Hence, the unfair expenses
that one must pay in order to compete in the industry. Fortunately,
the remedy is simple; modify the UAAA by removing registration
fees from Section Nine of the UAAA. In turn, the UAAA will be
void of fees and lay the foundation for a SPARTA amendment.
B. Amending SPARTA
Amending SPARTA is the second step. Currently, twenty-two
states have yet to adopt the UAAA. These twenty-two states, many of
which do not require registration, remain hot beds for unethical
athlete agents. To prevent unethical behavior, reduce student-ath-
lete ineligibility, and protect academic institutions from sanctions, a
federal law is needed to solidify registration in these states. This
was the motivation behind SPARTA. However, as written, SPARTA
is silent in terms of registration fees, and that silence leads to the
aforementioned unfairness and reduction of professional business
intimacy. Thus, an amendment is needed that will create a reasona-
ble and fair registration fee.
The registration fee should effectively screen applicants and
offset registration costs, yet not bar aspiring contract advisors from
the industry. With these thoughts in mind, a one-time nationwide
registration fee of $2,000 per individual, plus an annual $1,000 re-
newal fee would be appropriate. This figure would be exclusive of
NFLPA and any other players' association fees.
Under this plan, the registration of the 900 plus NFLPA con-
tract advisors will create large annual revenues. Additional
thousands will be generated by the registration of athlete agents
who are registered with the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion, the National Hockey League Players Association and the Na-
tional Basketball Players Association, as well as those who represent
individual athletes, e.g. boxing.
The key to creating a fair registration fee is defining the word
individual in a way that subjects every person to registration. Ac-
cordingly, SPARTA's definitions section must be amended to in-
clude a definition for individual. Such definition should read as
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follows: "any one person acting for his or herself or within a busi-
ness organization." This minor adjustment will assure equal fair-
ness between all contract advisors and dissolve any registration
advantage for large agencies. In turn, there will be less incentive
for agents to form large agencies at the expense of professional bus-
iness intimacy. Hopefully, it will help prevent conglomeration.
Opponents may argue that a lower fee will create a greater op-
portunity for runners and illegal funneling. Agent regulations,
however, now have teeth at both the federal and state level. Thus, it
will be difficult for agents to perform such acts without suffering
the consequences.
C. Revising Section 2(g)
The final step in ensuring fairness and strengthening business
intimacy is revising Section 2(g). Acknowledging the NFLPA's de-
sire to decongest itself, an ouster clause, like Section 2(g), seems
logical. However, the term of any ouster clause should be long
enough to afford a contract advisor the opportunity to develop his
or her practice, work with athletes and engage in fair competition.
With these thoughts in mind, Section 2(g)'s term should be ex-
tended from three years to five years. Additionally, signing a prac-
tice squad player should satisfy league requirements.
Similarly, the NFLPA should cease researching the feasibility of
adopting an amendment that would limit the number of contract
advisors certified by the league. There is no reason why the NFLPA
should seek to bar aspiring agents from pursuing the career of their
choice, especially when it has an ouster clause in place. Imagine if
the American Bar Association attempted to limit or cap bar admit-
tance. There would be a plethora of actions brought nationwide.
V. CONCLUSION
Below Section Nine of the UAAA, its drafters wrote:
[A] thlete agent registration is the cornerstone of this act.
High registration fees imposed by some states with ex-
isting acts have probably contributed to seemingly small
numbers of registrants under these acts. The success of
this act may be contingent upon the implementation of a
reasonable fee structure that does not motivate non-
compliance.
8 7
87. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS AcT § 9, 7 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 2000) (explaining
high fees implemented by state law).
2005]
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Recognizing their vision, we need to modify the UAAA, amend
SPARTA, and revise Section 2(g), in order to create fair and reason-
able federal athlete agent licensure and abolish the current exorbi-
tant expense that is associated with the industry. In sum, the
natural laws of supply and demand should govern entry into the
contract advisor industry, not overly expensive registration fees.
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CONTRACT ADVISORS' CONCERNS & LAMENTS
APPENDIX A
































States with Active UAAA Legislation in their Legislative Chambers
Missouri South Carolina
States with Existing non-UAAA Athlete Agent Regulation Law
California Colorado Iowa
Louisiana Michigan Missouri
Ohio Oregon South Carolina
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APPENDIX B
UAAA State Registration Fees
State Registration Reciprocity Renewal Renewal Term Other
Fee Registration Fee Reciprocity
Fee Fee
Alabama $200 $100 $100 $100 2 years None
Arizona $20 $20 $20 $20 2 years None
Arkansas $500 $100 $500 $100 2 years None
Connecticut $200 $200 $200 $200 1 year None
Delaware $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 2 years None
District of $515 $515 $515 $515 2 years None
Columbia
Florida $750 $750 $445 on $445 on 1 year None
even years even years
Georgia $200 $200 $200 $200 Term expires $10,000
on June 30th Bond
of odd years




Indiana $700 $700 $700 $700 2 years None
Kansas $515 $515 $515 $515 2 years None
Kentucky $300 $300 $100 $100 1 year None
Maryland $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 2 years None
Minnesota $500 $500 $400 $400 2 years None
Mississippi $100 $100 $50 $50 Term expires $50
June 30th Filing
annually Fee
Montana $200 $200 $200 $200 2 years None
Nevada $500 $500 $500 $500 2 years None
New York $100 $100 $50 $50 2 years None
North Carolina $200 $200 $200 $200 1 year None
North Dakota $250 $250 $150 $150 2 years None
Oklahoma $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 2 years None
Pennsylvania $200 $150 $200 $150 2 years None
individual individual individual individual
$400 $300 $400 $400
corporation corporate corporate corporate
Rhode Island $100 $100 $100 $100 1 year None
Tennessee $500 $500 $200 $200 2 years None
Texas $1000 $1000 $1000 $1000 1 year None
individual individual individual individual
$100 per $100 per $100 per $100 per
individual individual individual individual
in an entity in an entity in an in an
entity entity
Utah $510 $510 $510 $510 2 years None
Washington $0 $0 $0 $0 None None
West Virginia $50 $50 $10 $10 2 years None
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Non-UAAA State Registration Fees
Reciprocity
Registration Registration Transfer
State Fee Fee Renewal Fee Renewal Fee Term Other
California $30 N/A N/A N/A None $100,000
insurance
coverage
Colorado $0 N/A N/A N/A N/A None
Iowa $300 N/A $300 N/A 1 year $25,000
Bond




Michigan 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A None
Missouri $500 N/A $500 N/A 2 years None
Ohio $500 N/A $500 N/A 2 years $20,000
Bond
Oregon 250 N/A $250 N/A 1 year None
South Carolina $300 N/A $300 N/A 2 years None
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APPENDIX C
















Kansas City Chiefs 25
Miami Dolphins 26
Minnesota Vikings 29
New England Patriots 31
New Orleans Saints 27
New York Giants 31




St. Louis Rams 23
San Diego Chargers 26
San Francisco 49ers 26
Seattle Seahawks 32




Data compiled by a roster review of 2003-2004 season
from the NFL website at http://www.nfl.com.
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